ploration of this common and relevant disorder, and will make epidemiological studies, and ultimately service planning based on these, more reliable than at present.
Before the inclusion of AD, there existed a diagnostic category that was especially beloved in some psychiatric traditions (e.g. Germany, Austria), but muddied the waters and was a source of confusion for many clinicians in other traditions (e.g. UK, USA). Reactive depression was a depressive condition that also had a trigger, and upon perusing the older textbooks [9] it is clear that this descriptive label caused considerable uncertainty for clinicians, not least because of doubts about the value of antidepressants in this condition, a view recently reinforced by others [10] . Over time there was a move to become atheoretical as regards aetiology, while basing the diagnostic criteria on psychopathology only. So, both DSM and ICD moved to merge the aetiologically constructed 'reactive' and 'endogenous' depressions into a single criterion-based dimension, called major deression in DSM and depressive episode in ICD. DSM is more specific in the criteria laid down, and according to the preamble it should be calibrated 'to the lowest level of inference'. Yet in a self-contradictory move the classifications retained the aetiological requirement for AD.
The Importance of AD
The removal of reactive depression and its replacement with AD reflects the clinical reality that many individuals exhibit abnormal emotional responses to stressful events that mimic depressive illness due to their symptoms, severity and/or duration, yet may not require a specific treatment (especially those of a pharmacological nature) as they spontaneously resolve on removal of the stressor or as adjustment develops over time, although short-term symptomatic treatment may necessitate pharmacotherapy on occasion. More usually, less invasive interventions, such as monitoring, psycho-education and empowerment programs or stepped care models, may be more appropriate for those patients [11, 12] . The utility of the concept has been recognised for over 50 years, in the specific diagnosis of AD and also in the now defunct category known as 'reactive depression'. Moreover, the category of AD is of particular clinical relevance, and arguably is central to the complex debate on the respective merits of antidepressant or psychological treatments for 'depression' [10] .
In spite of its conceptual and clinical utility, critics have not been deterred and have described AD as a 'wastebasket diagnosis' and as a 'cryptic form of disease entity' [13] . Proponents have answered by pointing to its predictive validity, and have demonstrated that it is a stable diagnosis, seldom transmuting into any other category [14] .
Conceptually, AD lies in the middle ground between normal stress responses on the one hand and illness on the other. The question is now not if this is a valid or clinically useful category, but whether the current criteria as constituted in DSM and ICD achieve the differentiation from normal reactions to stressful events on the one hand and from other axis 1 disorders on the other ( table 1 )?
This paper is an attempt to critique the current diagnostic criteria for AD with depressed mood and to make recommendations for the DSM-V criteria based on our iterative discussion.
Critique of DSM Criteria
Criterion A -Temporal Relationship to a Stressor AD is defined by DSM-IV as comprising emotional or behavioural symptoms occurring within 3 months of exposure to an identifiable stressor. The close proximity in time is necessary to ensure that the condition is in fact a reaction to a stressor, and a time period of 3 months seems reasonable based on the limited information available on the temporal relationship between events and symptom onset. Some have recommended an extension in the time period to allow for delayed-onset AD [15] , but as this is very uncommon, even in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, a condition in which arguably the stressors are much more severe), an extension would in our opinion increase the likelihood of false-positive diagnoses due to erroneous aetiological associations being made between symptoms and distal events.
Concerning the type of events, there is little to assist the clinician in distinguishing AD from major depression. While 100% of those with a diagnosis of AD have recent life events, 83% of those with major depression also experience such events [16] , with more related to marital problems and fewer to occupational or family stressors in the AD as compared to the major depression group. Such differences, while statistically significant, are unlikely to be clinically meaningful in an individual patient, so specification of the type of events would be inappropriate.
With regard to the second element of this criterion, there is no definition of what constitutes a stressor, and it is presumed that this is whatever the person says it is. Usually, it means an event that is external to the person, and the range could span those that are generally perceived to be mild, such as having a row with a boyfriend, through to a life-threatening illness being diagnosed; the vagueness in this regard might be subject to question. However, applying a rigid definition might lead to the counter-criticism that some very vulnerable people, who have pathological reactions to events generally regarded as mild, would fail to be diagnosed with AD, even when significant symptoms and functional impairment were present. So, a simple linear model between stressor and depressive symptom response is too simplistic, since individuals vary in their reaction to events due to modifiers such as individual vulnerability, expectations, personality and genetic liability to depression [17] [18] [19] . Hence, the development of symptoms in response to a stressor can be regarded as the interaction of stressors and personal, environmental and biological factors. We therefore believe that no operational definition of what a stressor is should be provided. Thus, the only requirement relating to the stressful event is that it must be regarded as causing the emotional or behavioural symptoms. This distinguishes the stressors of an adjustment disorder from psycho-social and environmental stressors, such as those classifiable on axis 4 of the DSM-IV or within the ICD-10-Z classification, which may provoke or aggravate a disorder, but not cause the disorder.
Criterion B -The Clinical Significance Criterion
Having established that the dysfunctional reaction is closely related in time to an event, the second requirement is that the symptoms are clinically significant. This criterion is an attempt to delineate the border between normal stress reactions and AD. However, it can validly be criticised as being vague and tautological [20] -simply being that what doctors decide is clinically significant. This criterion has been broken into 2 components: distress in excess of what would normally be expected (criterion B1) or significant impairment in social or occupational functioning (criterion B2).
With regard to the first of these (criterion B1), distress in excess of what would be expected poses some problems since what is normally expected varies hugely. For example, some cultures are naturally more emotionally expressive than others and some social groups are more likely to consult with symptoms than are others, so the mere fact of visiting a doctor should not necessarily be deemed to be a proxy measure of severity. There are individuals who are more emotional than others and there are some for whom a particular event, such as losing a job, has devastating consequences, factors that might be expected to produce responses that are in excess of what would normally be expected. For these reasons, if the excessive reaction were simply a statistical requirement then a high proportion of those experiencing normal stress reactions might be classified as disordered, running the risk of pathologising normal human adaptive processes [21] [22] [23] . So, the presence alone of a greater number or severity of symptoms does not necessarily imply disorder, since this depends on the personal, social and cultural context in which the symptoms occur.
However, what of the internal context? It has been suggested that individual meanings, values and temperament might also make the person's reaction to a stressor greater without being disordered [24] . While we agree that cultural and other external factors provide an important backdrop against which the severity of the response should be evaluated, we believe that individual factors such as temperament and personality are not suitable since it is precisely these inherent attributes that make for vulnerability and trigger such excessive reactions. Hence, we believe that individual personality factors should not be weighted in evaluating context, but that culture and stressor severity should.
The alternative criterion of significant impairment (criterion B2) in social or occupational function as it stands also poses problems. Responses to stress are often associated with impairments in functioning, both in themselves and secondary to symptoms. For example, a serious illness in a child might be associated with parent re-evaluating life's goals and purpose so that prior hobbies seem irrelevant and are not pursued, while poor concentration associated with worry might impair ones ability to function at work. So, functional impairment of itself is not necessarily indicative of disorder, although of course it might be. This line of reasoning suggests that function should be removed as a criterion, but what of the opposite consideration -is it possible to have a disorder, yet exhibit no functional impairment?
While it may be possible in some mild disorders to conceal impairment, it is unlikely that all areas of functioning will be spared. For example, while some might continue to work either through tenacity or of necessity, it is unlikely that all roles e.g. social, interpersonal or academic would be unimpaired. So, we believe that functional impairment should be retained as one of the criteria for AD, since it is this which other people notice and which leads to treatment-seeking behaviour.
We propose to include a requirement that both criteria, i.e. distress and dysfunction, rather than either on its own are present, so as to reduce the risk of normal reactions being recorded as pathological.
Criterion C -The Disturbance Must Not Meet the Criteria for Another Axis 1 Disorder
The second border dispute concerns the distinction between AD and other axis 1 disorders, most commonly major depression. To what extent do the symptom criteria, as presently detailed in DSM-IV, separate those with AD from major depression? Studies comparing one with the other have failed to identify distinguishing symptom profiles in those being rehabilitated following physical illness [25] or in those with depressive disorders in the general population [26, 27] . The latter also failed to identify differences in social supports or personality disorder. Some have described differences in symptom severity and in the nature and severity of stressors, as well as more rapid improvement in those with AD as compared to major depression [16] . However, no study has identified specific distinguishing symptoms, and the current criteria do not mention any specific symptoms apart from the current sub-categorisation of AD (see 'Other AD Subtypes') based on presumptive symptoms. Thus, the symptom criteria as presently constituted do not assist in differentiating AD with depression from major depression. The most likely explanation for this is that the diagnosis of AD is a longitudinal one, based both on aetiology (a causal stressor) and longitudinal course (resolution over time or when the stressor or its effects are removed), while the diagnosis of depressive illness is based on symptom duration, severity and number. Another reason for the failure to identify distinguishing symptoms may be that research is focused on depressive symptoms as defined in DSM-IV, and these are too non-specific to allow such distinctions to be made. For example, based on our clinical experience, affect modulation as a characteristic of depressed mood seems to be typically impaired in non-reactive depressive disorders, but not in adjustment disorders, notwithstanding the fact that both are associated with depressed mood. Typically, the mood state of those with AD depends more on the cognitive presence of the stressor, so that immediate impairment of mood is observed when the stressor is mentioned, while followed by a more pronounced mood recovery when the patient is distracted as compared to those with major depression. Moreover, the presence of diurnal mood change or a decrease in mood reactivity might increase the likelihood of a depressive episode rather than an AD [28] . Hence, a system of weighting, in which some symptoms assume greater diagnostic importance than others, may become a possible way forward to allow for the differentiation between AD and major depression.
The salience given to other diagnoses over AD is arguably the most important problem in the current AD cri-teria and results in the conflation of AD with major depression, since a patient with 5 or more depressive symptoms owing to an identifiable stressor will get a major depression diagnosis regardless of the context in which symptoms have developed -despite the fact that the 5-symptom diagnostic window is easily crossed. Consider a man with a family who loses his job, and as the sole earner has to continue to finance the running of the household and the mortgage. Such a person might easily describe sleep and appetite disturbance, poor concentration secondary to worry, low mood and withdrawal from social contacts due to embarrassment. Taking the context in which the symptoms developed into consideration, it is likely that when he finds a new job his symptoms will improve spontaneously. Nevertheless, adopting the symptom checklist approach of DSM-IV, he will be diagnosed with major depression and probably prescribed antidepressants, even though conceptually his symptoms would be best classified as AD.
Evidence that this criterion brings about the conflation of AD with major depression, and consequently leads to over-diagnosis of the latter, comes from a recent study of those presenting to accident departments with selfharm [29] . It demonstrated that a clinical diagnosis of AD was made in 31.8% and major depression in 19.5% of patients, while using SCID the proportions were 7.8% and 36.4%, respectively. There is an obvious gap between the diagnostic process in clinical practice, which takes account of symptoms, context/duration and is dynamic, compared to diagnosis using standardised methods that restrict the process and rigidly apply the specified criteria in 'cook book' fashion. Nowhere is this more obvious than with AD.
Further supportive evidence that this criterion results in major depression being over-diagnosed, either at the expense of AD or of non-pathological stress responses, comes from a study that re-analysed the ECA (Epidemiologic Catchment Area) and NCS (National Comorbidity Survey) data, taking account of the clinical significance imperative [30] . It scaled downwards the prevalence of all disorders, by 17% in the ECA and by 32% in the NCS. The authors speculated that the high prevalence of disorder, coupled with the low rate of service use in those studies, might not so much indicate unmet need as the absence of the need. Ultimately, inflated prevalence estimates lead to mistrust of mental health planning based on such studies.
So, simply separating AD from major depression on the basis of symptom numbers alone is insufficient. This view is supported by calls for a return to the older classification based on endogeneity and reactivity [31] , resulting from studies showing that patients with reactive depressive disorders are more likely than patients with endogenous symptoms to improve with various types of psychotherapy [10] . This echoes the view of others [32] that the range of therapies beneficial in treating major depression is so diverse, spanning counselling, assisted bibliotherapy, cognitive therapy, placebo and antidepressants, that it strongly suggests major depression is so diverse as to be meaningless, and that a return to a more nuanced definition should follow.
For these reasons, i.e. the failure to distinguish AD from major depression, the over-diagnosis of major depression at the expense of AD and the heterogeneity of major depression as currently constituted, we suggest the removal of criterion C. This implies a nosological redefinition of AD and of major depression based on distinct inclusion and exclusion criteria for each, rather than one subsuming the other.
Criterion D -The Bereavement Exclusion
Symptom Severity. The current AD criteria state that the symptoms do not represent bereavement, and the criteria for major depression also have a bereavement exclusion. We believe that the exclusion of normal reactions such as those to bereavement, while including those that are pathological, is the essence of AD. Nevertheless, by specifying bereavement there is a danger that dysfunctional bereavement reactions will also be excluded, when in some instance they might best be included as AD. For example, a person who was excessively emotionally dependent on their spouse will reach the criteria for major depression easily, and so their reaction might more appropriately be construed as an AD.
Duration. Inherent in bereavement is the recognition that the person is 'permitted' to have significant symptoms for a longer period than following other events without being classified as disordered. However, depending on other environmental factors, it might take a person who is also physically ill longer to adapt to an adverse event than if he/she was in full health. So, the context in which the event occurs, be it bereavement or otherwise, is important both in relation to symptom severity and duration.
We believe the criteria for this section should change to reflect this complexity, and that the bereavement exclusion should extend to other events also. This would continue to recognise the special place of bereavement in the wider emotional world as ordinarily being non-disordered, but would also prevent other reactions that are currently misclassified as pathological from being so categorised, e.g. the response to a diagnosis of serious illness.
Similar changes have been urged in relation to the major depression criteria [21] , so that there too the bereavement exclusion should extend to other events in recognition of the importance of context. For example, reactions triggered by loss of employment, serious physical illness and broken relationships may sometimes lie within the boundaries of an uncomplicated reaction if the context is serious, even when the 5-symptom threshold has been reached. We support extending the bereavement exclusion to these other events in the major depression criteria in recognition of context and the narrow diagnostic window between a reaction that is considered of no real consequence for patients' health and one that justifies the diagnosis of major depression. This would have the effect of reducing false-positives for major depression, some of which would move into the AD category while others would continue to constitute normal reactions, which are not in need of treatment.
When considering the revision of the bereavement criterion, however, one should keep in mind that the aforementioned reflections may be redundant if complicated grief is classified separately. Recently, the new diagnostic concept of a complicated grief disorder has been intensively studied. It showed that a noteworthy minority of bereaved individuals experience persistent distressing and disabling symptoms of grief [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] . Research on this condition indicates that major loss can cause a substantial amount of psychiatric morbidity. Explicit proposals to include a complicated grief disorder into DSM-V are on the way [38] .
Other AD Subtypes
Six subtypes of AD have been described based on the prominent emotional/behavioural symptoms ( table 1 ) . Although these have not been fully operationally defined, attempts have been made in the DSM-IV-TR to outline a few associated symptom patterns more fully.
However, subtypes other than those currently listed in DSM-IV and ICD-10 should also be considered for inclusion. Maercker et al. [8] proposed an AD subtype that resembles sub-syndromal PTSD. Here, the stressor is of lesser magnitude than those seen in PTSD, yet leads to PTSD-like symptoms (avoidance, intrusion symptoms and failure to adapt). This might incorporate the AD anxiety subtype, often diagnosed following a diagnosis of major medical illnesses, financial losses or other unpredictable life events [8, 39] . Others [40] have suggested that post-traumatic embitterment disorder should be included as AD subtype, characterised by its predominant emotional mixture of despair, anger and accusations. These orphaned groups could find a home as subgroups within the AD category.
The grouping of AD into acute ( ! 6 months) and chronic ( 6 6 months) is in keeping with clinical experience and evidence [16] , and should not be changed.
Inadequate ICD Criteria
If there are problems with the DSM criteria for AD, then they are even more pronounced with the ICD criteria. As shown in table 1 , the ICD-10 criteria can all be grouped according to the DSM-IV-TR criteria, while there remain DSM criteria that are not mentioned within the ICD-10 criteria. Thus, the critique of DSM criteria is also applicable to AD defined by ICD-10.
The main differences between DSM and ICD are a more restrictive time period, during which symptoms must develop in response to a stressor (3 vs. 1 month/s), the missed incorporation of an explicated clinical significance criterion and the bereavement criterion, which is not mentioned in the ICD-10. As aforementioned, a close proximity in time is necessary to ensure that the condition is in fact a reaction to a stressor. There is hardly any evidence which time period is appropriate for AD. However, since some life events such as work relocation entail a long period of organisational change following the event, emotional reactions may be time-delayed. Since these delayed reactions are 'in response to a stressor', a time period of 3 months seems to be more appropriate. However, further differences, such as the failure to include a criterion of clinical significance, lead to an even vaguer concept of AD in ICD-10 as compared to DSM-IV-TR.
The Impact of Inadequate Criteria
Does it matter that AD criteria are inadequate? One of the resulting problems is that the volume of research involving AD is limited. A search of Medline reveals only 108 titles comprising the term 'adjustment disorder(s)' up to June 2008. The discrepancy between practice and research raises the issue of why research activity does not focus on this diagnostic group especially as they are said to be very common, particularly in general medical settings [41] . Most of the research tools used in epidemio-logical research such as the Composite International Diagnostic Interview [42] do not include AD, presumably because they are restricted to use by lay interviewers. The Schedule for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry [43] includes AD in section 13, dealing with inferences and attributions, yet provides no guidelines on its application. With the exception of the ODIN study [44] , none of the major international community-based epidemiological studies, such as the NCS-(R) [45, 46] , the British National Household Survey [47] or the German GHS-MHS [48] , have included AD [49] . Thus, in the research community, it is no surprise that research into AD is sparse. This results in a unique situation in which a very frequent disorder with a high economic impact is not accompanied by any treatment guidelines.
Recommendations for DSM-V
It is our belief that the neglect of AD stems from the inadequate operationalisation of AD in DSM-IV and ICD-10 and also from its relegation behind other diagnoses, particularly major depression. On the basis of the current difficulties with a diagnosis that has clinical relevance, yet is imprecisely conceptualised and under-researched, we recommend major changes to the DSM-V (and ICD-11) criteria for AD in an attempt to improve the status of AD with depressed mood ( table 2 ) .
Criterion A No changes to this criterion are recommended.
• The development of emotional or behavioural symptoms in response to one or several identifiable stressor(s) occurring within 3 months of the onset of the stressor(s).
Criterion B
The definition of 'clinical significance' should be changed so as to reduce the proportion of those experiencing normal reactions that are misclassified as having disorders. Thus, both the distress and functioning wording should be modified and the emphasis placed on the context in which the symptoms have developed. These symptoms or behaviours are clinically significant as evidenced by both of the following: Criterion C Remove the subordination of AD to other diagnoses, such as major depression. This also implies a revision of the criteria for the corresponding specific disorders:
• Stressors may also trigger adverse reactions that symptomatically resemble major depression, anxiety or conduct disorders, but are better classified as AD, particularly when there is a close temporal relationship between the event and the onset of symptoms, and spontaneous recovery is anticipated after a period of adaptation or when the stressor is removed. Additionally symptoms should be identified that are likely to distinguish AD from depressive episode. As mentioned previously, the presence of diurnal mood change or changes in mood reactivity seem to contribute to a better differentiation between depression with external as compared to endogenous causes [28] . However, there is insufficient research on the discriminative power of these or other symptoms to propose criteria based on them at this point.
Criterion D
The bereavement exclusion should be extended to other events:
• The diagnosis does not include normal bereavement.
• Other events may also require a longer period for adaptation to occur, similar to bereavement, and yet not be classified as pathological. This is most likely if the stressor is uncommon or severe.
Criterion E
No changes to this criterion are recommended.
• Once the stressor (or its consequences) has terminated, the symptoms do not persist for more than an additional 6 months. This criterion for AD is important in distinguishing AD from other disorders. An AD diagnosis requires the presence of a stressor or the consequences of a stressor, and if this is not present the symptoms should not be labelled as AD.
Other Subtypes
The subtypes should continue to be split, with attempts made to define the symptoms present in each.
The following subtypes are worthy of further investigation:
• With PTSD-like symptoms (not meeting the PTSD stressor and/or symptom criterion).
• With (post-traumatic) embitterment symptoms.
Conclusion
The current criteria for AD require significant refinement for inclusion in DSM-V and ICD-11. Some will have implications for the criteria for major depression. The result will reduce the false-positive and false-negative diagnoses. These changes will enable the scientific exploration of this common and relevant disorder, and will make epidemiological studies, and ultimately service planning based on these, more reliable than at present.
